The Conducting Forensic Analysis and Incident Response Using Cisco CyberOps Technologies (CBRFIR) (300-215)

The root cause analysis in incident response focuses on identifying the initial trigger or root cause of the incident to understand how it started and how to prevent recurrence. In this scenario, the phishing email sent to the victim (A) is the initial trigger that led to the employee’s action of clicking the malvertising link, resulting in the malware download.

The other options represent later stages in the incident response cycle, such as detection (SIEM alert, cybersecurity team’s alert) or supporting evidence (email header information), but they do not address the root cause, which is the phishing email itself .

This aligns with the CyberOps Technologies (CBRFIR) 300-215 study guide , which states that identifying the initial vector of compromise is critical to the root cause analysis phase of incident response (Chapter: Incident Response Techniques, page 410-412).

Fileless malware operates in memory and often leverages legitimate tools such as PowerShell to avoid traditional file-based detection. Since these threats don ' t leave typical file traces, analysts must rely on PowerShell event logs to trace suspicious or unauthorized script execution.

The Cisco CyberOps Associate guide explicitly states:

“PowerShell logs provide insight into script block execution and can reveal indicators of fileless attacks that reside in memory.”

Hence, PowerShell event logs are the most effective forensic source for detecting fileless malware activity on Windows systems.

A “malicious insider” is someone within the organization who has authorized access but intentionally misuses that access to extract or exfiltrate data. In this case:

The HR user has legitimate access but deviates from their normal behavior pattern (accessing legal data daily instead of monthly).

The presence of large data dumps and the alert from a threat intelligence platform suggest intentional misuse rather than accidental behavior.

According to the Cisco CyberOps Associate guide, insider threats are identified by behavioral anomalies, especially involving sensitive data access patterns inconsistent with role-based access and historical usage profiles.

The exhibit shows a series of process executions that form a suspicious chain involving scripting engines and obfuscated commands:

One critical indicator is cmd.exe executing PowerShell with obfuscated (Base64-encoded) arguments . The use of Base64 is a known method used by attackers to mask malicious commands. This aligns with attack techniques defined under MITRE ATT & CK T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter) and T1086 (PowerShell abuse). Therefore, option D is valid.

Another important IOC is WScript.exe acting as a parent of cmd.exe , which is abnormal in typical business environments. This indicates potential misuse of Windows Script Host (WSH) to launch commands, often seen in phishing or malware dropper scenarios. Thus, option E is also valid.

Options A and B by themselves are not definitive IOCs—PowerShell and cmd.exe are legitimate administrative tools and frequently used in Windows environments.

Option C is not supported by the exhibit—the reverse (powershell.exe initiated by WScript.exe) is what ' s seen, not the other way around.

These patterns align with the CyberOps Technologies (CBRFIR) 300-215 study guide, which specifies that chaining of interpreters (e.g., WScript → cmd → PowerShell) with encoded commands is a key indicator of compromise during forensic analysis.

TCPdump is a CLI-based packet capture tool that is widely used for real-time traffic inspection and analysis on Unix/Linux systems.

TCPshark is a variant CLI tool used similarly for packet analysis.

Although Wireshark is a powerful network protocol analyzer, it requires a GUI. Therefore, it is not suitable for environments without a graphical interface.

Process injection is a tactic where malicious code is inserted into the memory space of another process, enabling it to run with the privileges and context of a legitimate application. The Cisco study guide explains that this method allows malware to " hide in plain sight " within trusted processes and evade endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools.

It specifically notes: " Process injection techniques allow malware to execute within the memory space of a legitimate process, avoiding detection and taking advantage of the process ' s permissions. " .

The use of repetitive patterns in images is a known indicator of steganography, which is an anti-forensics technique used to hide malicious code or files inside seemingly benign content such as image or audio files. The repetitive patterns suggest that the image may contain embedded hidden data. This technique is particularly difficult to detect through conventional scanning or antivirus software.

According to the CyberOps Technologies (CBRFIR) 300-215 study guide, steganography is defined as “concealing malicious content or instructions within ordinary files such as .jpg, .png, or audio files, allowing the content to bypass security filters and reach the target system without detection”.

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Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) offers features like:

File trajectory: to track file behavior and spread across endpoints.

Orbital Advanced Search: for querying endpoint data to detect threats in real time.

To determine the correct script, we evaluate the following requirements:

The script must search for the IP address 192.168.100.100.

The output should be written to a file named parsed_host.log.

The matching lines should be printed to the console.

Analysis of the options:

Option A: Correct IP regex used and correct output filename, but reads from parsed_host.log instead of a source log file like test_log.log (not ideal for initial parsing).

Option C: The IP address used is 192.168.100.101 instead of 192.168.100.100 — incorrect.

Option D: Same IP address and logic as Option B, but uses print statement without parentheses, which is not valid in Python 3 unless using Python 2 — not ideal.

✅ Option B:

Uses correct IP: " 192.168.100.100 "

Reads from test_log.log (presumably the source log file).

Writes to output/parsed_host.log.

Prints each matching line and writes to output file — satisfying all conditions.